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INVESTMENTS AND SECURITY: 
BALANCING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY WITH 
EXPANDED AUTHORITY FOR THE 
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Christopher W. Jusuf* 
“I believe strongly in free trade but it also has to be fair trade. It’s been a long 
time since we had fair trade. . . . I am not going to let America and its great 
companies and workers be taken advantage of any longer. They have taken 
advantage of our country. No longer.” 1 In his first address to Congress in 2017, 
newly inaugurated President Donald Trump vowed to reverse what he saw as a 
decades-long policy of international commerce that was hurting the American 
worker. This view on trade policy was a central element of his populist platform 
that propelled then-candidate Trump to victory in the 2016 presidential election2 
and represented a significant departure from traditional Republican 
commitments to free enterprise and low barriers to international commerce.3 
                                                          
 Born and raised in southern California, Mr. Jusuf earned his B.A. from Hamilton College 
in 2015 and his J.D. from the Columbus School of Law in 2021. His professional experience 
includes work on congressional staff, political campaigns, and as a consultant for the 
Department of Defense. The proud son of immigrants, Mr. Jusuf cherishes the legacy of 
freedom, diversity, and internationalism that draw so many from around the world to 
America’s shores. He would like to thank his parents for their example he continuously 
strives to emulate, his professors and mentors for their unending guidance, and the staff of 
The Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology for their support throughout the 
production of this writing. 
 
1 Donald Trump, President, Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress 
(Feb. 28, 2017) (transcript available in the DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.). 
 2 Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade, TIME (June 28, 2016), https://time.com/ 
4386335/donald-trump-trade-speech-transcript/. 
 3 Julia Azari, Why The 2016 Election Won’t Go Away, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 7, 
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Although public opinion still varies widely on the issues of trade deficits, free 
trade agreements, and foreign competition with American businesses,4 
lawmakers and administration officials have long acknowledged the effects of 
international commerce on national security. This issue has largely remained 
unaddressed in mainstream American political discourse.5 
In March of 2018, the federal government blocked semiconductor giant 
Broadcom from acquiring the San Diego-based chip manufacturer Qualcomm 
for $103 billion.6 Earlier that year, the government also stopped a similar firm, 
Hubei Xinyan, from purchasing semiconductor testing company Xcerra Corp for 
$580 million.7 More notably, in a case involving Huawei Technologies, the 
Chinese smartphone giant was halted from a deal with AT&T to sell its products 
in the US.8 Each transaction was killed by a little-known—but increasingly 
powerful—administrative panel within the executive branch: the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (also “the committee”).9 Each 
case also represents a new front in the growing technological, economic, and 
strategic competition between China and the US.10 Unlike more commonly 
known executive powers, such as imposing tariffs or sanctions, CFIUS authority 
enables the president to completely prohibit specific transactions—or even 
suspend existing deals—when justified for national security purposes.11 
From 2013 to 2015, the last years that CFIUS released unclassified data, 74 
of the 387 (19.1%) reviewed transactions were focused on cases involving 
                                                          
2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-2016-election-wont-go-away/ (noting 
that “on multiple occasion during the 2016 campaign, Trump broke from Republican 
orthodoxy, including on issues such as free trade and health care”). 
 4 Lydia Saad, Americans’ Views on Trade in the Trump Era, GALLUP (Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/267770/americans-views-trade-trump-era.aspx. 
 5 See Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box: The Growing Abuse of the 
National Security Rationale for Restricting Trade, CATO INST. (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/closing-pandoras-box-growing-abuse-
national-security-rationale. 
 6 Emily Stewart, The Broadcom-Qualcomm Deal and Trump’s Decision to Block It, 
Explained, VOX (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/13/ 
17116288/qualcomm-broadcom-trump-cfius-treasury-deal. 
 7 Greg Roumeliotis, U.S. Blocks Chip Equipment Maker Xcerra’s Sale to Chinese State 
Fund, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/xcerra-ma-hubeixinyan/u-
s-blocks-chip-equipment-maker-xcerras-sale-to-chinese-state-fund-idUSL2N1QD01X. 
 8 Sijia Jiang, Huawei’s AT&T U.S. Smartphone Deal Collapses, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-at-t-huawei-tech/huaweis-att-u-s-smartphone-
deal-collapses-idUSKBN1EX29E. 
 9 Kevin Granville, Cfius, Powerful and Unseen, is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
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China-based acquirers.12 Given the recent focus to counter increasing Chinese 
influence, this number will likely grow in the coming years.13 This effect will be 
multiplied by the increased scope of authority granted to CFIUS with the 2018 
enactment of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 
(FIRRMA).14 While recognized by many officials as a necessary asset to protect 
American national security interests, especially in an era of emergent Chinese 
aggression, many critics are concerned that CFIUS is an overly blunt tool that 
puts an unnecessary burden on business transactions and will have negative 
impacts on economic growth that will outlive the current US-China rivalry.15 
Originally created and operated by an Executive Order under President Gerald 
Ford in 1975,16 CFIUS traces its statutory origins to the 1988 “Exon-Florio” 
amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950, which authorized the 
president to “review certain corporate mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers, and 
to investigate the potential impact on national security of such actions.”17 Later, 
the 2007 Foreign Investment and National Security Act officially established 
CFIUS in a statute during concerns over foreign purchases of US port activity.18 
The 2018 FIRRMA legislation represents the most significant expansion of 
CFIUS authority in the committee’s history. It has already been used to 
dramatically increase the number of transactions reviewed; thus, making the 
committee’s review “a core aspect of capital fundraising and [mergers and 
acquisitions] for more businesses than it has been in the past.”19 Originally 
established as a voluntary advisory committee, CFIUS has evolved into what 
has been called “the No. 1 weapon in the Trump administration’s protectionist 
arsenal” and the “ultimate regulatory bazooka.”20 
This article proposes that the FIRRMA expansion of CFIUS authority 
provides necessary tools to protect important American national security 
interests in a highly dynamic power competition with China, but statutory or 
                                                          
 12 2015 COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U. S. ANN. REP. 16. 
 13 Mercy A. Kuo, CFIUS and China: The FIRRMA Factor, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 17, 
2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/cfius-and-china-the-firrma-factor/. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Robert Teitelman, The Biggest Threat to Mergers Could Be a Secretive Government 
Agency, BARRON’S (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/committee-foreign-
investment-cfius-mergers-51556635683; Hernan Cristerna, Deal-Making is Alive and Well, 
but the Market is Changing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
08/25/business/dealbook/deal-making-is-alive-and-well-but-the-market-is-changing.html? 
module=inline. 
 16 Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975). 
 17 JARED T. BROWN & MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43767, THE 
DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950: HISTORY, AUTHORITIES, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
CONGRESS 18 (2018). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Kuo, supra note 13. 
 20 Cristerna, supra note 15; Granville, supra note 9. 
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administrative limitations should be instituted to prevent abuse and to avoid 
undue economic burdens that do not affect national security. “Section I: Prior 
Law” will review the administrative and statutory history of CFIUS to establish 
the original policy goals for the committee, and to determine how its structural 
makeup enables—and limits—its reach. “Section II: The Foreign Investment 
Risk Review Modernization Act” will explore in-depth the legislative history, 
text, and regulatory effects of FIRRMA. “Section III: Analysis” will assess the 
merits of various arguments surrounding CFIUS and FIRRMA, as well as review 
cases in which CFIUS has exercised its newly expanded jurisdictional authority. 
“Section IV: Conclusion” will close the article with a summary of its findings 
and outlook on the future. 
I. PRIOR LAW 
A. Executive Order 11858 
On May 7, 1975, President Ford issued Executive Order 11858, creating 
CFIUS.21 Section 1(a) established that the committee comprises six 
representatives—none below the assistant-secretary level—designated by the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of Commerce, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs 
(Chief Economic Advisor), and the Executive Director of the Council on 
International Economic Policy.22 The order designated the representative from 
the Department of the Treasury as the chairman of the committee and granted 
the chairman authority to invite representatives from other departments and 
agencies to participate in committee business.23 Section 1(b) outlines CFIUS’s 
primary responsibility of “monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the 
United States, both direct and portfolio, and for coordinating the implementation 
of United States policy on such investment.”24 In execution of this duty, the 
committee is directed to provide various forms of analyses and advice to the 
president on foreign investments, including a “review [of] investments in the 
United States which, in the judgment of the [c]ommittee, might have major 
implications for United States national interest.”25 Section 1(c) directs the 
committee to “submit recommendations and analyses to the National Security 
                                                          
 21 Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. at 20,263. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
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Council and to the Economic Policy Board” should the need arise.26 
In its early years, CFIUS existed merely as an advisory committee without 
any explicit responsibility over matters of national security.27 The inclusion of 
the Department of Defense (DoD) as a permanent member of the committee 
suggests that national defense is to be included in its overall review of foreign 
investments.28 However, the primary motivation for its creation was spurred by 
increasing concerns about members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) investing in American financial assets for political influence 
over economic benefit.29 President Ford created the committee to ease these 
concerns and “dissuade Congress from enacting new restrictions” on foreign 
investment.30 
Initially, CFIUS was not a particularly active organization; meeting only ten 
times between 1975 and 1980.31 Beginning in 1980, the committee evolved into 
the national security-focused organization that it is today.32 At the request of the 
DoD, CFIUS investigated several proposed acquisitions by foreign firms of 
various American companies that produced materials or products used by the 
military.33 DoD-requested investigations comprised a majority of CFIUS 
activity between 1980 and 1987.34 
B. The Exon-Florio Amendment 
In response to concerns about increasingly frequent acquisitions from 
Japanese technology companies, Congress passed the “Exon-Florio” 
Amendment as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.35 
This provision updated the Defense Production Act of 1950 to give explicit 
authority to the president to “block proposed or pending foreign ‘mergers, 
acquisitions, or takeovers’ of ‘persons engaged in interstate commerce in the 
United States’ that threaten to impair the national security.”36 Exon-Florio also 
                                                          
 26 Id. 
 27 See id. (omitting from the CFIUS’s mandate any explicit national security 
responsibilities). 
 28 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 31 (2019); see also Exec. Order No. 11858, 
supra note 16. 
 29 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 4 (2019). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 6. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 6 (2019). 
 35 Id. at 7. 
 36 Id. 
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established the parameters in which the president could invoke this authority by 
limiting it to situations in which “1) other U.S. laws were inadequate or 
inappropriate to protect the national security; and 2) ‘credible evidence’ existed 
that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatened to 
impair U.S. national security.”37 It should be noted that the first version of the 
bill encompassed transactions implicating “national security and essential 
commerce.”38 President Ronald Reagan vetoed this version of the bill because 
he believed that “essential commerce” would be too broad of a category that 
could extend the president’s authority to review transactions that did not meet 
the “traditional concepts of military/defense.”39 Congress conceded to the 
administration’s request to limit review authority only to matters directly 
impacting national security by removing the “essential commerce” language.40 
President Reagan signed the Exon-Florio Amendment into law and 
implemented it via Executive Order 12661, which delegated the new authorities 
to CFIUS.41 The executive order prescribed deadlines for the review process, as 
well as certain required elements in the committee’s report to the president.42 
Notably, the new provisions changed the prescribed membership requirements 
to replace the “representatives” from each of the respective departments with the 
secretaries of each department—signaling the newly heightened importance of 
the committee.43 Further, the order added the Attorney General and the Director 
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as permanent members of the 
committee.44 Even though CFIUS was not explicitly designated as the executing 
agency in the Exon-Florio Amendment, President Reagan’s implementation 
effectively reformed the committee into an expansive and far-reaching entity 
with broad authority to review foreign investments and recommend to the 
president that certain transactions be halted for national defense purposes.45 
Perhaps the most significant effect of the Exon-Florio Amendment is that it 
signaled to the White House that Congress wanted the presidency to play a more 
active role in assuaging public concerns about possible detrimental effects of 
malicious foreign investment, while simultaneously removing the legislative 
                                                          
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 7–8. 
 40 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 7 (2019). 
 41 Exec. Order No. 12661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 7, 1988). 
 42 Id. at 780–81. 
 43 Id. at 779. 
 44 Id. 
 45 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 7-8 (2019). 
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branch from the process.46 Although Congress did not want to change the US’s 
long-standing policy of openness to foreign investment and trade, some 
industries were concerned that they would be wrongfully considered for review 
under the auspice of national security.47 Because CFIUS serves as a direct 
advisor to the president, and is comprised entirely of presidential appointees, its 
approach and aggressiveness in pursuing limitations is largely determined by the 
president’s philosophical outlook toward foreign investments.48 
C. The Byrd Amendment 
In 1992, Senator Robert Byrd inserted an amendment to the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1993, to yet again increase CFIUS’s 
reach.49 Unlike the existing discretionary authority enjoyed by the committee at 
the time, the “Byrd Amendment” introduced language that explicitly required 
the president—through CFIUS—to investigate any “instance in which an entity 
controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any 
merger, acquisition, or takeover which could result in the control of a person 
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States that could affect the national 
security of the United States.”50 The Byrd Amendment further expanded the 
scope of CFIUS and reinforced its now primary purpose of addressing national 
security concerns. However, ambiguity in some of its language would later 
inspire Congress to further amend the provision for greater clarification.51 
D. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act 
Despite its existence since 1975, CFIUS itself was not expressly authorized 
by statute until President George W. Bush signed the Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act (FINSA) on July 26, 2007.52 In codifying CFIUS into law, 
FINSA’s main provisions clarified the review and investigation process, 
increased oversight measures for Congress, and added tracking and enforcement 
                                                          
 46 See id. at 8 (noting that “Congress attempted to strengthen the President’s hand in 
conducting foreign investment policy, while limiting its own role as a means of emphasizing 
that, as much as possible, the commercial nature of investment transactions should be free 
from political considerations”). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 9. 
 50 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 
837, 106 Stat. 2315, 2464 (1992) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170). 
 51 H.R. REP. NO. 110-24, at 10 (2007). 
 52 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 4, 10 (2019). 
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measures to be implemented after committee decision.53 The bill further 
expanded the scope of CFIUS review by adding security implications to “critical 
infrastructure” as review criteria.54 In addition, FINSA prescribed three factors 
to consider during a national security review of a transaction: (1) the threat posed 
by the foreign investment in terms of intent and capabilities, (2) the potential 
aspects of the business activity that could pose vulnerabilities to national 
security, and (3) the national security consequences if the vulnerabilities are 
exploited.55 FINSA also added the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security as permanent members of the committee.56 
Part of Congress’ motivation for FINSA was to address a “potential 
misreading of Congressional intent in the so-called ‘Byrd amendment’ to Exon-
Florio” by ensuring “that transactions involving companies controlled by foreign 
governments will receive heightened scrutiny by CFIUS.”57 This concern arose 
after CFIUS approved Dubai Ports World’s purchase of management operations 
of several major port facilities around the US.58 Although corrective 
administrative measures were later taken to address these concerns, Congress 
felt it was time to implement a more robust statutory framework upon CFIUS.59 
E. The Regulatory Framework and Process 
This section will outline the standard practices and guidelines CFIUS 
operated under prior to FIRRMA’s enactment. As mentioned above, the 
president was authorized to: 
suspend or prohibit any “covered transaction” when, in the 
President’s judgment, there is credible evidence to believe that the 
foreign person exercising control over a U.S. business might take 
action that threatens to impair the national security, and when 
provisions of [other law] do not, in the judgment of the President, 
provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to 
protect the national security.60 
“Control” is defined as: 
                                                          
 53 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, §§ 2, 5, 
7, 121 Stat. 246 (2007) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061 note). 
 54 § 2(b)(2)(E). 
 55 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 10 (2019). 
 56 Foreign Investment and National Security Act § 3. 
 57 H.R. REP. NO. 110-24, at 10 (2007). 
 58 Id. at 12. 
 59 Id. at 13. 
 60 31 C.F.R. § 800.101 (2011) (emphasis added). 
2020] Investments and Security 153 
the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through the 
ownership of a majority or a dominant minority of the total 
outstanding voting interest in an entity, board representation, proxy 
voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal 
arrangements to act 
in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters 
affecting an entity.61 
Prior to FIRRMA, there were four categories of “covered transactions” that 
CFIUS had review authority over: (a) a transaction which results or could result 
in control of a US business by a foreign person; (b) a transaction in which a 
foreign person conveys its control of a US business to another foreign person; 
(c) a transaction that results or could result in control of any part of an entity or 
assets, if such a part of an entity or assets constitutes a US business; and (d) a 
joint venture in which the parties enter into a contractual or other similar 
arrangement, in which a foreign person could control a US business by means 
of the joint venture.62 
Non-covered transactions include: (a) a stock split or pro rata stock dividend 
that does not involve a change in control; (b) a transaction that results in a foreign 
person holding ten percent or less of the outstanding voting interests in a US 
business, but only if the transaction is solely for the purpose of passive 
investment; (c) an acquisition of any part of an entity of assets that do not 
constitute a US business; (d) an acquisition of securities by a person acting as a 
securities underwriter in the ordinary course of business and in the process of 
underwriting; and (e) an acquisition pursuant to a condition in a contract of 
insurance related to fidelity, surety, or casualty obligations if the contract was 
made by an insurer in the ordinary course of business.63 
In order to initiate a review of a covered transaction, a party to the transaction, 
normally the US business, will provide voluntary notice to the committee that 
will include several important pieces of information required by the regulation.64 
Parties—understanding that CFIUS has the authority to review a transaction 
indefinitely, even after execution—generally comply with this voluntary notice 
procedure in order to avoid possible divestment risks or other punitive actions 
by the president.65 
After the notice is accepted, CFIUS has thirty days to review the transaction.66 
By the end of this review period, the committee can begin an investigation phase 
                                                          
 61 § 800.204(a). 
 62 § 800.301(a)–(d). 
 63 § 800.302(a)–(e). 
 64 § 800.401(a). 
 65 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 8 (2019). 
 66 31 C.F.R. § 800.502(b). 
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if any member of the committee believes the transaction poses a threat to 
national security.67 If the committee chooses not to undertake the additional 
investigation, CFIUS action on that transaction is concluded, and the parties may 
proceed with their plan.68 If the committee chooses to commence an 
investigation, the investigation must begin before the end of the thirty-day 
review period, and the investigation may not last longer than forty-five days.69 
No later than one day after the investigation concludes, CFIUS shall send a 
report to the president if (1) the committee recommends that the president 
suspend or prohibit the transaction, (2) the committee is unable to reach a 
decision on suspension or prohibitions, or (3) the committee requests that the 
president his or herself makes a determination on the transaction.70 The 
committee is not required to report to the president if it concludes its 
investigation and finds that no further action is needed.71 
Although on paper it seems that this process takes a maximum of seventy-five 
days, in practice it often takes much longer for a transaction to be fully 
reviewed.72 Because the list of information required in their notices is extensive, 
companies have adopted a practice of “pre-filing” with CFIUS to ensure that the 
committee has all the information it needs in order to complete a formal 
review.73 Additionally, companies will often withdraw from the formal review 
in order to address specific concerns that the committee may have with its plan 
that would otherwise preclude approval.74 
F. CFIUS in Action Prior to FIRRMA 
One of the challenges in assessing past-CFIUS practice is the fact that the 
committee rarely releases public data on its reviews. In order to protect both 
proprietary business information for US companies, as well as classified 
information regarding national security priorities, CFIUS is mandated to keep 
information on parties and transactions confidential during and after review.75 
However, an unclassified version of a 2015 report to Congress provides some 
insight into the general activity of the committee during that time, albeit on a 
                                                          
 67 § 800.503(a)(1). 
 68 § 800.504. 
 69 §§ 800.505–506. 
 70 § 800.506(a), (b)(1)–(3). 
 71 § 800.506 (d). 
 72 H.R. REP. NO. 110-24, at 11 (2007). 
 73 Id. at 10. 
 74 Id at 10–11. 
 75 31 C.F.R. § 800.702(a)–(d). 
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macro level without providing details of individual cases.76 In 2015, CFIUS 
reviewed 143 covered transactions and investigated sixty-six of them.77 Eleven 
notices were approved after CFIUS directed mitigating measures to address 
national security concerns.78 Three notices were withdrawn and abandoned after 
CFIUS and the parties were unable to identify mutually acceptable mitigating 
measures; one notice was rejected outright.79 
The number of notices, and consequently the number of investigations, 
steadily increased each year between 2009 and 2015, with the frequency of 
reviews more than doubling during that period.80 China is involved in about 
twenty percent of all CFIUS reviews, which is more than any other country.81 In 
the same period, from 2013–2015, investments from the United Kingdom and 
Canada—both staunch US allies and trading partners—comprised the second 
and third countries in the same metric.82 
In order to protect classified information, CFIUS does not release conclusions 
reached on whether there is a coordinated effort to acquire critical US 
technology companies, but data suggests that Chinese firms acquire more critical 
US technology companies than any other non-ally nation.83 Even more 
concerning was the committee’s conclusion that foreign adversaries are 
committed to using a range of tactics to obtain critical US technology.84 The 
committee determined that “[s]ensitive U.S. economic information and 
technology are targeted by the intelligence services, private sector companies, 
academic and research institutions, and citizens of dozens of countries.”85 
II. THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISK REVIEW MODERNIZATION 
ACT 
In explaining its motivation behind passing FIRRMA, Congress stated: 
it should continue to the be the policy of the United States to 
enthusiastically welcome and support foreign investment, consistent 
with the protection of national security; at the same time, the national 
security landscape has shifted in recent years, and so has the nature 
of the investments that pose the greatest potential risk to national 
                                                          
 76 2015 COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U. S. ANN. REP. 12. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 3. 
 81 Id. at 16. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 28. 
 84 Id. at 31. 
 85 Id. 
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security, which warrants an appropriate modernization of the 
processes and authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States.86 
Congress also stated that a national security nexus is a prerequisite for the 
committee to review a case for the purposes of defending a national interest.87 
FIRRMA’s most significant reform to CFIUS is the expansion of scope with 
four new “covered transaction” categories in addition to the existing 
classifications.88 These include (1) the purchase or lease by a foreign person of 
real estate located on or near US government property that may provide 
surveillance abilities; (2) non-passive foreign investments in any company that 
works with “critical technology,” “critical infrastructure,” or “sensitive personal 
information of U.S. citizens;” (3) changes in existing ownership rights that could 
change control of a US company; and (4) any other transaction structured to 
circumvent CFIUS review.89 
Additionally, FIRRMA adds six new factors that committee members must 
consider while reviewing a notice: (1) involvement of a country of “special 
concern” that seeks to acquire critical technology or infrastructure; (2) potential 
national security effects of cumulative control of a critical technology or other 
assets; (3) a foreign person’s history of complying with US law; (4) how control 
of US industries and commercial activity affects the US’s ability to produce 
materials and products needed by the Department of Defense; (5) the extent to 
which a covered transaction could expose private information of US citizens to 
foreign persons as it affects national security; and (6) the likelihood a covered 
transaction creates or worsens a cybersecurity vulnerability.90 
Other than expanding CFIUS’s review scope and criteria, FIRRMA also 
makes several administrative changes to the committee, including the 
establishment of a specialized fund in which CFIUS may charge fees to fund 
reviews and hire additional staff to perform the increased workload expected 
with the expanded jurisdiction.91 FIRRMA also centralizes much of CFIUS’s 
staff within the Treasury Department and directs all other participant 
departments to designate an assistant secretary position to oversee the 
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department’s CFIUS activities.92 The time limit for the review phase was 
extended from thirty to forty-five days, and the committee may now invoke a 
fifteen-day extension on the investigation phase under “extraordinary 
circumstances.”93 Lastly, FIRRMA grants CFIUS greater authority to initiate 
reviews unilaterally,94 an ability that has some critics worried about overreach.95 
On January 17, 2020, the Treasury Department’s Investment Security Office 
published the final rules to implement FIRRMA into the US regulatory regime. 
The publication came in two parts: the first implementing the majority of 
FIRRMA provisions96 and the second implementing the provisions regarding 
the new rules on real estate transactions.97 These rules took effect on February 
13, 2020.98 A subsequent publication on February 18, 2020, made technical 
corrections to these rules to provide clarity but did not make significant policy 
changes to the regulations.99 
In clarifying what CFIUS considers when reviewing a covered transaction, 
the rule states that any committee analysis should consider the following 
elements: the threat, the vulnerabilities, and the consequences to national 
security related to a potential transaction.100 The threat is defined as “the intent 
and capability of a foreign person to take action to impair the national security 
of the United States.”101 The vulnerabilities are the “extent to which the nature 
of the US business presents susceptibility to impairment of national security.”102 
The consequences to national security are the “potential effects on national 
security that could reasonably result from the exploitation of the vulnerabilities 
by the threat actor.”103  
The Treasury Department noted that during the notice-and-comment period 
for the regulation, several stakeholders requested that the definition of “critical 
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technology” be amended from those used in the proposed rules.104 The 
Department, however, noted that FIRRMA sets the definition of the term, and 
did not give the executive branch discretion to change the statutory definition.105 
Under FIRRMA, critical technologies include products in any of six specified 
categories: (1) defense products included in the US Munitions List as “set forth 
in the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR),” (2) items on the 
Commerce Control List of the Export Administration Regulations, (3) specially 
designed equipment and components related to nuclear energy, (4) nuclear 
facilities and material, (5) specified agents and toxins, and (6) “emerging and 
foundational technologies.”106 Prior to the publication of the final rule, 
stakeholders were concerned that there was not a clear definition of “emerging 
and foundational technologies.”107 The Department responded by incorporating 
the definition of the same term from the previously enacted Export Control 
Reform Act of 2018.108 However, that act does not have a specific definition of 
the term itself, and instead gives wide discretion to the administration to identify 
such technologies that “are essential to the national security of the United 
States.”109 These terms are particularly important because the new regulations 
permanently codify a pilot program that required mandatory notice filings by 
parties to transactions involving critical technology.110 Such transactions 
involving critical technology, along with transactions that would result in 
controlling interests by a foreign government, require the parties to file a 
mandatory notice, rather than the standard voluntary notice.111 Firms that fail to 
comply with the mandatory filing requirement may face fines of $250,000 or the 
value of the transaction, whichever is greater.112 
Furthermore, the regulation defines “critical infrastructure” as any “systems 
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating 
impact on national security.”113 
Lastly, the regulation clarifies what constitutes “sensitive personal 
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information of U.S. citizens” in several protected data categories, such as 
genetic, identifiable, or anonymized data.114 The information included in these 
data categories is as follows: financial information, consumer commerce data, 
insurance information, health information, non-public electronic 
communications (email, messaging, chats), geolocation data, biometric data 
(facial recognition, voice, retina, fingerprints), data related to federal or state 
government identification cards, data related to US government security-
clearance status, or data related to an application for a security clearance or 
federal employment.115 
Combining the technology, infrastructure, and data categorizations of 
companies, the regulation created the term “TID”116 to refer to parties that are 
subject to increased scrutiny under the new FIRRMA policy.117 Under FIRRMA, 
transactions with TID companies do not necessarily need to grant a foreign 
person control of the company in order to be subjected to CFIUS jurisdiction, 
which was the previous status quo.118 Now, TID-company transactions could be 
subject to review if the investment would give a foreign person “1) access to 
material nonpublic technical information; 2) membership or observer rights on, 
or the right to nominate an individual to a position on the board of directors; or 
3) involvement, other than through voting of shares, in substantive decision-
making of the US business regarding critical technology, critical infrastructure, 
or sensitive personal information.”119 TID companies are also subject to the 
mandatory reporting requirement when a potential investment would give 
twenty-five percent or more voting interest to a foreign person in which a foreign 
state has a forty-nine percent or more voting interest.120 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Country of Special Interest 
One of the more controversial additions to CFIUS is the “country of special 
concern” provision that effectively allows the committee to discriminate against 
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certain countries.121 Even though China is not explicitly named in the text of the 
bill, the veil of pretense over the true target of the revamped CFIUS is noticeably 
thin.122 During deliberations over FIRRMA, Senator John Cornyn said, “What 
we need to do is elevate everybody’s understanding of what China’s strategic 
long-term goals are, and they are to dominate the United States economically 
and militarily. They’ve got a very clear strategy for doing that, and we need to 
wake up to that and make sure we’re responding in kind.”123 
Some have argued that this prejudicial treatment of China over other 
international actors is unjust and politically motivated.124 These critics cite the 
fact that CFIUS is comprised of politically-appointed members, and it often 
chooses to review specific types of transactions that originate from China when 
it declines review of similar transactions from other countries.125 Calling CFIUS 
review a “protectionist” policy, critics state that the committee sets up the US 
and China in an unnecessarily adversarial relationship.126 Others have stated that 
the administration has “‘taken almost like a whack-a-mole approach to dealing 
with these issues, because it seems that as soon as a Chinese company is in the 
news, all of a sudden that becomes the new target. . . . It seems very unlikely 
that there is thinking going on about the longer term strategy, and much more 
likely that the focus instead is on this politically motivated attack on an 
application because it’s a Chinese-owned app, even if there are real security 
questions.’”127 However, heightened concern over China is hardly a 
phenomenon specific to CFIUS, and is consistent with the Trump 
administration’s overarching National Defense Strategy.128 
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is published every four years, one year 
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after the start of each presidential term.129 The NDS highlights the 
administration’s broad strategic objectives as they relate to national security, and 
it is used by the DoD and other agencies as a guiding principle to adhere to while 
crafting and executing policy.130 The Trump administration’s NDS explicitly 
labeled “revisionist powers” like China and Russia as a “central challenge to 
U.S. prosperity and security.”131 Specifically, the NDS accuses China of 
“leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory 
economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to 
their advantage.”132 The NDS notes that China exploits the long-standing 
international order of cooperation and mutual benefit in order to establish its 
own hegemony in the region.133 
For years prior to FIRRMA’s enactment, senior lawmakers and DoD officials 
have raised suspicion over the rapidly increasing amount of Chinese money 
coming into the US to invest in high-tech products, such as robotics, drones, and 
artificial intelligence (AI).134 In a Pentagon-commissioned report to Congress 
and the president, top military officials warned that China is actively seeking to 
acquire American technology companies to help grow its military and economic 
capabilities.135 In a separate report, experts warned that Chinese state-owned 
firms were being actively guided by national plans to acquire and invest in AI 
and advanced robotics technologies.136 Pentagon officials at the time concluded 
that existing government protections designed to protect critical defense 
technology were insufficient, which paved the way for FIRRMA.137 
As part of a wider, multi-pronged approach to “get tougher” on China, the 
Trump administration used the expanded CFIUS authorities to stop several 
different Chinese acquisitions in the telecom,138 microchip,139 and even social 
media industries.140 The coerced divestiture of the Grindr dating app is 
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particularly noteworthy because it represents one of the rare instances in which 
CFIUS unilaterally initiated a review of a transaction that had already been 
completed in an industry with seemingly minimal national security interest.141 
Although CFIUS does not publicize its specific concerns with particular cases, 
Grindr does collect users’ images, names, locations, messages, and HIV statuses; 
each of these data points are all potentially compromising information should 
they fall into the wrong hands.142 This justification, if it is in fact what the 
committee used to warrant the action, could have serious implications for a 
rapidly growing digital economy.143 In an era with app developers, marketers, 
and other entities regularly collecting data from each of their users, some fear 
that nearly every business that operates online is within the reach of CFIUS.144 
These fears could be verified with the controversy surrounding TikTok. The 
mobile-based app, owned by the Chinese firm ByteDance, allows users to create 
and share short-form video content with music, narration, and various visual 
effects.145 In just a few years, the app became incredibly popular in the US, 
especially in younger demographics.146 At the end of 2019, TikTok had over 
thirty-seven million users in the US.147 While seemingly innocent on its face, 
TikTok, like many other social media apps, collects users’ geolocation 
information, IP addresses, and content of in-app messages.148 This data falls 
within the expanded criteria of covered transactions under FIRRMA, which now 
includes sensitive personal data such as geolocation.149 American leaders have 
raised alarms that ByteDance may give this information to the Chinese 
government, an allegation the company has repeatedly denied.150 Former 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said “with respect to Chinese apps on people’s 
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phones,” users should be cautious about their private information getting “in the 
hands of the Chinese Communist Party.”151 These concerns have led to CFIUS 
opening an investigation into ByteDance’s 2016 acquisition of Musical.ly, the 
American precursor to TikTok.152 In response to this investigation, a group of 
American investors immediately began considerations in buying out the app to 
bring control over the app’s data and decision making into American hands.153 
Regardless of whether TikTok and ByteDance would actually give private US 
user data to the Chinese government, it appears that the mere threat of CFIUS 
intervention may have achieved its policy end goals.154 However, before CFIUS 
concluded its investigation of TikTok, President Trump issued an executive 
order to effectively ban the app’s usage within the US.155 Instead of acting 
through CFIUS, Trump issued this order through authorities granted by the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), an analogous statute 
that grants even broader powers to the president to intervene in the markets in 
response to declared emergencies.156 Although acting through a different statute, 
the reasoning behind the order is nearly identical to the justifications put in place 
by FIRRMA: 
TikTok automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users, 
including Internet and other network activity information such as location data 
and browsing and search histories. This data collection threatens to allow the 
Chinese Communist Party access to Americans’ personal and proprietary 
information – potentially allowing China to track the locations of Federal 
employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, 
and conduct corporate espionage.157 
On September 19, 2020, TikTok reached a deal with Oracle, a California-
based data technology company, to have Oracle take a 12.5% stake in TikTok 
and to store the app’s data on Oracle’s secure cloud servers.158 In the press 
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release announcing the agreement, Oracle CEO Safra Catz said: “We are a 
hundred percent confident in our ability to deliver a highly secure environment 
to TikTok and ensure data privacy to TikTok’s American users, and users 
throughout the world. This greatly improved security and guaranteed privacy 
will enable the continued rapid growth of the TikTok user community to benefit 
all stakeholders.”159 This agreement seemed to satisfy the US government’s 
concerns over the security of American data on the app, but questions still 
remain.160 
The Grindr and TikTok cases prove that the Trump administration was not 
hesitant to wield CFIUS and other expansive authorities to counter increasing 
Chinese encroachment on American interests, even in transactions that would 
not traditionally be considered national security concerns. 
B. Is CFIUS Now Too Powerful? 
In an era of hyper-partisanship and gridlock on Capitol Hill, CFIUS has 
achieved the near-impossible and received wide bipartisan support in both 
chambers of Congress.161 Although lawmakers tried to reach a delicate balance 
between protecting national interest and fostering free enterprise, many critics 
still share concerns about a relatively obscure government working group that 
effectively acts as a gatekeeper for international investment in US companies.162 
Given that CFIUS largely reflects the president’s views on trade, such worries 
may be warranted—especially under the Trump Administration, which had a 
proven penchant towards protectionist policies.163 Some critics of CFIUS 
authority have pointed to the blocked acquisition of Qualcomm by its Singapore-
based competitor, Broadcom.164 Qualcomm is a leading innovator in the US in 
the development of 5G wireless technology.165 However, even though Singapore 
is a close American ally and Broadcom has stated its intention to reincorporate 
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back into the US, President Trump announced that he would stop the acquisition 
before the final terms had even been reached by the parties.166 In a rare public 
statement on the decision, the White House cited concerns with Broadcom’s 
“relationships with foreign entities” and fears that the deal would “weaken 
“Qualcomm’s technological leadership,” giving an edge to Chinese companies 
like Huawei.”167 The committee further explained that Chinese dominance in 5G 
would have severe repercussions for US national security.168 However, if CFIUS 
can justify any interference with a non-adversary country for the purpose of 
preserving American competitive edge over Chinese industries, at what point 
does the net cease to extend over every part of the technology industry? 
Critics of CFIUS and the protectionist policy remain justifiably skeptical. In 
the Qualcomm case, President Trump intervened before notice of the potential 
transaction was accepted by CFIUS.169 Some have viewed this intervention as 
sign of “the administration’s willingness to be more active in trade and 
implementing protectionist policies.”170 The increased authority and 
intentionally vague review criteria set out in FIRRMA expands the president’s 
ability to exercise this more proactive approach.171 This has caused many to raise 
concerns that the damage CFIUS would cause to the economy may outweigh the 
potential benefits it provides in mitigating perceived national security risks.172 
This concern may be realized with the implementation of the expanded 
authorities for CFIUS under FIRRMA.173 
C. The Real Value of Trade 
For the last half century, officials and academics largely recognized that 
international trade supports national security by creating a robust system of 
interdependence and shared consequences between nations, which prevents 
large conflicts from erupting.174 The modern US economy relies heavily on 
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international trade, and lawmakers have traditionally sought to lower barriers to 
trade rather than raise them.175 However, CFIUS and FIRRMA stand as 
exceptions to this general rule, to the chagrin of many who would prefer the 
federal government take a more laissez-faire approach to the matter. 
Because of FIRRMA’s robust ambiguities, critics are concerned that it will 
cause a chilling effect on foreign investments into the US that do not pose a 
national security risk but are still vital to American economic prosperity.176 As 
discussed above, FIRRMA’s expanded scope was largely directed to curb 
aggressive Chinese maneuvers, but its lack of language explicitly specifying 
China as a threat could easily be interpreted to be applied to any country of 
“special concern” that could threaten the competitive advantage of American 
companies.177 If this fear were to materialize, and if CFIUS began exercising 
proactive review of transactions from non-adversary or even allied countries, it 
would be easy to see that the international business community may view the 
US as a more hostile market that is too risky to attempt penetration.178 This 
would prove disastrous for US businesses and workers, who are becoming 
increasingly reliant on foreign capital to sustain themselves or expand. 
Congress and the Treasury Department seemed to understand the concern that 
business leaders had about the blanket-jurisdiction of a post-FIRRMA CFIUS, 
which would cover all foreign investments.179 This led them to include a 
provision in FIRRMA to create a new category of “excepted foreign states” from 
which “excepted investors” would enjoy limits on how much CFIUS would be 
able to review their transactions.180 The regulations clarify that the committee is 
responsible for identifying such excepted foreign states.181 Excepted investors 
are generally persons or governments who are nationals of excepted foreign 
states and are not nationals of any non-excepted foreign state.182 The committee 
chooses excepted states by determining whether a candidate nation “has 
established and is effectively utilizing a robust process to analyze foreign 
investments for national security risks and to facilitate coordination with the 
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United States on matters relating to investment security.”183 
As this classification of excepted foreign states is new to the committee, it has 
only designated three nations in this group: Canada, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom (U.K.).184 These states are historically close allies of the US.185 and 
were chosen for their “robust intelligence-sharing and defense industrial base 
integration mechanisms with the United States.”186 However, this special status 
with the U.K. came under threat because of concerns over the country’s decision 
to integrate Huawei technology into its 5G network infrastructure.187 Some US 
lawmakers went as far as to call for the end of intelligence-sharing status with 
the British over this decision.188 Luckily, the U.K. chose to reverse this decision 
in response to pressure from Washington and its own intelligence review.189 The 
top Democratic and Republican members of the House Armed Services 
Committee called the reversal “a reassuring development that will benefit not 
only British security and privacy, but the ability of our countries to work even 
more closely together on vital security matters.”190 Senator Ben Sasse put it more 
bluntly: “The UK made the right call today to kick the Chinese Communist spy 
ring out of their network. The special relationship is stronger now, as are our 
joint efforts to expose the threats the CCP and their surveillance puppet pose to 
the free world.”191 Despite being eventually alleviated, the U.K.-Huawei 
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controversy underscores the seriousness with which the American government 
considers the threat of aggressive Chinese investment practices.192 This case 
highlights the extent to which the US would go to counter this threat, even at the 
potential cost to relationships with long-standing economic and strategic 
partners. 
In addition to the chilling effect on international investments into the US, 
critics are even more concerned about the potential consequences to American 
businesses if other countries begin implementing their own CFIUS-like bodies 
in response to perceived protectionism from the US.193 US stock markets 
experienced high volatility as a result of the growing trade war between China 
and the US.194 If tensions between China and the US do not dampen soon, some 
fear that an “economic iron curtain” would polarize the world into two separate 
economic spheres, led by the US in the West and China in the East.195 This 
“economic iron curtain,” much like the iron curtain of the Cold War, would sever 
access to markets of billions of people and could be catastrophic to the global 
international order.196 
However, the debate over trade policy with China is not unique to the policies 
surrounding CFIUS or this generation of leaders. Ever since the Nixon 
administration reopened a relationship between Washington and Beijing, most 
experts believed that increased economic and diplomatic cooperation between 
nations would liberalize authoritarian regimes and integrate them into the 
community of nations that prioritize individual liberty, free enterprise, and 
human rights.197 As recently as 2002, President Bush outlined in his National 
Security Strategy: “Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is 
the only source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political 
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freedom is the only source of national greatness.”198 Almost twenty years later, 
with China actively operating mass-detention facilities for religious 
minorities,199 suppressing democratic movements in Hong Kong,200 and 
conducting thinly-veiled military threats against neighboring sovereign 
nations,201 most would say that this goal is yet to be achieved. As stated in the 
Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, China wants to “shape a 
world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.”202 
The increased focus on countering Chinese investments into the US has had 
a dramatic effect. In 2018, Chinese foreign direct investments into the US totaled 
$4.8 billion, a decrease of 84% from 2017 and down 90% from 2016.203 This 
decrease was due to new tariffs, increased trade disputes between the two 
countries, a general economic slowdown, and CFIUS, which had discouraged 
many investors from seeking new deals or had caused others to abandon ongoing 
investment deliberations out of fear of government intervention.204 Although 
American businesses undoubtedly benefit financially from the investments of 
Chinese enterprises and persons, the legislative history of CFIUS delegates an 
explicit statutory duty to the executive branch to weigh that benefit against the 
costs that US strategic interests may incur.205 The Trump administration made it 
clear that the president’s stance was to engage in a proactive— some would say 
overly aggressive—approach to counter this increasing threat.206 The 
overwhelming bipartisan support for the FIRRMA amendments in Congress 
suggests that both major political parties share—or at least acquiesce to—this 
position. 
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D. Considering Judicial Review 
Understanding that CFIUS provides an important tool to protect national 
security and strategic interests, some scholars have proposed incorporating more 
safeguards in the review process in order to not overburden international 
commerce while still maintaining the committee’s general mission directive.207 
One proposed option is to implement protections modeled after the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), an analogous statute that oversees 
executive review of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for national 
security concerns.208 
OFAC may freeze assets and restrict access to US financial institutions by 
sanctioned countries or factions, like drug traffickers or terrorism groups, who 
have been designated by the US government. It may also impose penalties on 
those who fail to comply with its directives.209 IEEPA’s safeguards come into 
effect at three points: prior to taking national security action, during such action, 
and after-action appellate review.210 Specifically, IEEPA requires that in order 
for OFAC to intervene in a case, there (1) must be a national emergency, (2) 
Congress must have oversight of the process, and (3) there must be an 
opportunity for judicial review of OFAC’s decision.211 
Given the preventative nature of CFIUS’s mission directive, and the way it 
has been historically exercised, OFAC’s requirement for a national emergency 
for jurisdiction would likely not be appropriate to translate to CFIUS.212 
Additionally, and as mentioned above, Congress has already imposed several 
oversight measures to ensure its legislative intent is carried out by CFIUS. 
Critics of CFIUS, however, are not concerned with the committee’s implications 
for the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, but 
instead on the potential overreach of the federal government in otherwise lawful 
business transactions.213 This raises the question of whether decisions made by 
CFIUS and the president under this authority should be subject to judicial 
review. More specifically, can a determination by the executive branch based on 
national security implications be contested in a court of law? 
This question was raised by appellees in Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign 
                                                          
 207 See Maddy Berg, A Tale of Two Statutes: Using IEEPA’s Accountability Safeguards 
to Inspire CFIUS Reform, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1765 (2018). 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 1780. 
 210 Id. at 1763. 
 211 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a), 1702(c), 1703(b) (2012); see also Berg, supra note 207, at 
1766. 
 212 See § 1701 (a)–(b); see also Berg, supra note 207, at 1767–70. 
 213 Cristerna, supra note 15. 
2020] Investments and Security 171 
Inv.214 The Ralls decision arose from a case in which Ralls Corporation 
purchased four American firms that operated windfarms in Oregon.215 Although 
Ralls was incorporated in the US, both of its owners were Chinese nationals with 
close ties to a major Chinese manufacturing firm.216 One of the sites of the 
acquired wind farms was within the US Navy’s restricted airspace, and the other 
three were in proximity of restricted airspace.217 Although there were other 
foreign-owned wind turbines within proximity of the same area, CFIUS 
determined the Ralls transaction to be a national security risk.218 Then-President 
Obama issued an order to prohibit the transaction and required Ralls Corporation 
to completely divest from the companies in question.219 Ralls Corporation 
proceeded to sue CFIUS and the president.220 
Ralls Corporation sought to invalidate CFIUS’s finding and the presidential 
order. It alleged violations of statutory authority, the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fifth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause.221 Although the decision in this case rested primarily 
on procedural due process considerations, with facts specific to this instance, the 
appeals court also discussed the justiciability of contesting a determination by 
the executive branch based on national security.222 For the purpose of this 
article’s thesis, analysis will focus on the latter discussion. 
The government asserted that Ralls Corporation’s due process challenge 
raised a nonjusticiable political question.223 The “political question” doctrine, as 
stated in Baker v. Carr, bars a court from considering a claim when: 
Prominent on the surface of [the] case . . . is found a [1] textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
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pronouncements by various departments on one question.224 
 
Applying this doctrine, the court acknowledged precedent that stated the 
executive branch’s finding of a threat to national security not to be justiciable.225 
The court recognized that such a determination represents a political question 
based on “foreign policy decisions of the Executive Branch . . . for which the 
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility to make.”226 Although 
the ruling in Ralls did not hinge on the political question doctrine, the court’s 
discussion of the doctrine’s application to national security determinations is still 
valid law, and remains the ruling precedent.227 With that understood, the court 
in Ralls also ruled that parties subject to CFIUS review are owed a due process 
right to review unclassified evidence the committee may have related to its case 
and contest matters of fact, but it also ruled that determinations of national 
security implications remain nonjusticiable.228 
In the years since Ralls, the bar on judicial review of national security 
determinations has not been challenged.229 With the judiciary restrained from 
interceding in CFIUS review and Congress explicitly delegating more authority 
to the committee, critics argue that foreign investors are left with too much 
uncertainty as to how, or if, to conduct business with US firms.230 
Some have argued that the Ralls decision should be rolled back, and that 
courts should begin exercising review of executive national security 
determinations.231 These critics claim that allowing judges to weigh in on such 
decisions will preserve constitutional protections for individuals and assuage 
concerns many businesses have with CFIUS authority.232 However, these critics 
ignore the long-standing political question doctrine, and they fail to 
acknowledge that the courts have stated that the judicial branch is not nearly as 
capable of making national security determinations as the executive branch is.233 
Adding a layer of judicial review on national security decisions may alleviate 
some concerns for certain classes of businesses, but it would effectively trample 
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on the separation of powers established by the founders. Rolling back Ralls 
would catastrophically hinder the president’s ability to execute his constitutional 
duty to protect the nation, and its debilitating effects would far outweigh any 
marginal benefits that may be seen with foreign investor stability. Although 
courts reserve the ability to review matters related to procedure and findings of 
fact in CFIUS cases, the Ralls precedent must be preserved, and courts should 
be barred from ruling on administrative determinations of national security. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After FIRRMA’s enactment, the Trump administration wielded CFIUS 
authority unapologetically and at a rate faster than any period in the committee’s 
history. As discussed above, the courts may not offer much relief for worried 
investors who fear their mergers and acquisitions will be halted by the 
committee. However, certain FIRRMA provisions implemented by regulation 
are beginning to ease concerns among investors from allied nations. The 
committee already designated Australia, Canada, and the U.K. as excepted ally 
states, and more states are likely to be added as the policy matures.234 This will 
provide substantially more stability to investors from trusted sources, as well as 
allow CFIUS to focus its attention on targeted nations that are more directly in 
line with the National Defense Strategy, namely: China, Russia, Iran, and their 
proxies.235 In practice, the Trump Administration framed nearly all of its 
publicly announced CFIUS decisions within the framework of the strategic 
competition with these nations. Although Congress likely used the “country of 
special concern” language to allow the administration greater flexibility in 
execution, it would be wise to ease concerns among allied nations by amending 
the law to specifically designate these competitor countries in statute. 
However, it is clear that CFIUS is here to stay and should be a key element of 
strategic planning by any business who seeks to operate with international 
investors or clients. This will be especially true under a divide between China 
and the US that is only deepening. In July of 2020, the US expelled the Chinese 
consulate in Houston and cited it as a hub to help direct “massive illegal spying 
and influence operations.”236 In response, China expelled a US consulate in 
Chengdu.237 
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At the time of this writing, the world is in the throngs of an unprecedented 
economic downturn as a result of the COVID-19 virus. This has leaders 
concerned that China will take advantage of vulnerable companies to acquire 
technologies or data to close the strategic gap with the US.238 In an effort to offer 
a better alternative to tempting Chinese investments, the DoD established the 
Trusted Capital Marketplace program to recruit “patriotic investors” to help 
finance promising firms.239 However, this program is still in its infancy and will 
take much more time to reach the same level of coordination and sophistication 
as China’s proxy firms, if it ever does.240 
Questions still remain about how the US and the rest of the world will emerge 
from the COVID-19 crisis. However, the resurgent US-China rivalry will likely 
remain, especially amid reports that China deceived the international community 
by hiding the truth about COVID-19, thus hindering other nations’ abilities to 
respond.241 With domestic opinions about the communist country at historic 
lows,242 an American-Chinese détente is becoming increasingly obscure, and the 
era of great-power competition will likely extend far into the foreseeable future. 
This tension will also likely continue with the new administration under 
President Joe Biden, as recognition of the dangers posed by China is quickly 
becoming a bipartisan consensus in Washington.243 Like the US-Soviet rivalry 
during the Cold War, both sides are ready and willing to pull every lever of 
power in order to counter the advances of the other.244 With the two largest 
economies on the planet245 poised to deploy their respective whole-of-
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government and whole-of-economy arsenals, companies of every size operating 
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